I. Introduction
On May 6, 2015, the SEC issued an order approving the National Market System (NMS) Plan to implement a Tick Size Pilot Program under the direction of both the National Securities Exchange and FINRA. The major function of the Tick Size Pilot is to increase the tick size for smaller capitalized securities with hopes of increasing trading, liquidity, and overall market quality in these securities. While not central to the tick size program's focus, we use the tick size change to examine recent theoretical predictions that suggest changing the tick size increment might influence trading activity across markets with different fee models.
1 Dating back to the turn of the century, market fee models incentivizing liquidity providers via rebates (i.e., maker-taker) have become commonplace for many U.S. stock markets. 2 Recently, an inverted fee model, the taker-maker fee model, is being used by three U.S. stock markets. This fee model allows for rebates to accrue to liquidity demanders. To the extent that changes in the tick size influences the decision to supply or demand liquidity, trading activity across market fee models may be influenced.
Extant literature suggests that the tick size increment plays a prominent role in determining the level of undisplayed or hidden orders. Specifically, in cases where the tick size acts as a binding constraint -when the bid-ask spread equals the tick size -a change in the tick size can impact not only transaction costs and trading volume (Harris, 1991 (Harris, , 1994 but also order exposure (Harris, 1996 (Harris, , 1997 . 3 Studying the Tick Size Pilot Program allows us to answer questions pertaining to the relation between tick sizes and order exposure, not only in the aggregate market but also across different market fee models, such as maker-taker and taker-maker, which cater to different clienteles.
1 Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013) posit that a change in the tick size impacts annualized revenue between optimal and uniform pricing policy. They further conclude that a coarser price grid is preferred by maker-taker fee model platforms.
2 See page 4 of https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-maker-taker-fees-on-equities-fee venues.pdf. 3 Harris (1994, 1996, 1997) argues that changes in the minimum price variation influence the level of displayed orders. Aitken, M.J., H. Berkman, and D. Mak (2001) show that traders are more likely to hide their orders when the tick size is small. Cebiroglu, Hautsch, and Horst (2014) provide a theoretical argument that tick sizes that are too large on a relative basis can prevent latent traders from trading publicly. The taker-maker inverted fee model allows traders to pay a fee to provide liquidity while takers of liquidity (i.e., liquidity demanders) earn a rebate. This fee model appeals to traders because it allows them to undercut prices and bypass the queue via paying the venue fee.
The inverted fee model (i.e., taker-maker) provides incentives for brokers to route orders to taker-maker models despite another exchange offering the same price. As Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2015) document, the taker-maker model effectively attenuates the presence of a minimum tick size since it allows a limit order trader to bypass an existing quote by simply paying an access fee rather than the full tick. Thus, taker-maker pricing allows dealers and traders a path to bypass limit order queues. Angel, Harris, and Spatt suggest that the SEC prohibit both fee models or to a lesser extent, allow clients, not brokers, to have direct access to all fees and rebates. Angel, Harris, and Spatt also suggest that due to the fragmented markets that exist today, increasing the tick size will incentivize dealers and proprietary traders to engage in quote-matching practices that allow traders to undercut current limit orders. Similarly, Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner (2015) argue a wider tick increases the presence of queue-jumping activity to gain priority of resting limit orders. Thus, to the extent we find that increasing the tick size increases the presence of taker-maker activity, one unintended consequence is that quote-matching could increase.
One argument in support of an increase in the tick size is to reduce fast (non-human) traders, thereby favoring human traders (Weild, Kim, and Newport, 2012) . Several studies suggest that the relative tick size influences the level of non-human or algorithmic trading. For example, Ye and Yao (2014) argue that a larger tick size hinders price competition and increases the role of time priority, in which traders with speed benefit. Similarly, O'Hara, Saar, and Zhong (2015) posit and find that a larger relative tick size allows high frequency market makers to become more aggressive, undercutting resting limit orders. Further, Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013) suggest that the trading frequency on market fee models may influence the level of algorithmic trading, indicating a positive relation between overall trading activity and algorithmic trading. We add to these recent studies by analyzing the effects of an increase in the minimum tick size on the level of algorithmic trading. Specifically, we identify if measures of algorithmic trading change across market fee models, maker-taker and taker-maker, using algorithmic trading proxies outlined by Weller (2017) . 4 We also analyze changes in hidden liquidity around the tick size change. One component of the tick size pilot is that it contains a "trade-at prohibition". The "trade-at prohibition" is aimed at curbing the level of price matching by trading centers that are not already offering or displaying a quote at the best price -a practice that is often associated with off-exchange trading centers or "dark" pools. Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong (2017) provide corroborating evidence that dark trading activity changes for the pilot firms subject to the "trade-at prohibition". We examine the relation between the larger tick size and hidden trading activity as hidden and dark trading are not exact substitutes (see Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts, 2015) . Hidden trading refers to the trading practice of using hidden limit orders in the lit venue limit order book while dark trading refers to off-exchange trading where private forums offer market participants pre-trade transparency. For instance, a change in the tick size may result in varying levels of hidden and dark trading activity as a wider tick size on a lit venue (i.e., quoting exchange) may incentivize traders to transact in the dark venue since dark venues offer more price improvement than the lit venue. On the other hand, a wider tick size may reduce the level of hidden liquidity since a wider tick size may reduce "undercutting" strategies of predatory traders (Harris, 1994 (Harris, , 1996 (Harris, , 1997 , providing investors an incentive to display orders.
The Tick Size Pilot program is interesting as the program contains different trading and quoting rules for the three pilot groups. For example, stocks in the first pilot group quote in $0.05
increments but continue to trade at current pricing increments ($0.01). The stocks in the second pilot group are quoted and traded in $0.05 minimum increments, but allow exemptions for midpoint executions, retail investor executions, and negotiated trades. The stocks in the third pilot group are subject to the same requirements as the stocks in the second pilot group but are additionally subject to a "trade-at prohibition". The trade-at prohibition prevents price matching by a trading center that is not currently displaying the best price. According to the SEC, the trade-at prohibition is synonymous with Reg NMS Rule 611 (i.e., "order protection rule") in that exceptions may exist.
5 Accordingly, the different rules associated with each pilot group may result in different outcomes for the groups following the tick size change. For example, since the second and third pilot groups are subject to quoting and trading at the larger minimum tick size, while the first pilot group is only subject to quoting at the larger pricing increment, our expectation is that changes in algorithmic trading, hidden trading, and trading across market fee models will be larger in the second and third pilot groups. Further, since the trade at prohibition is applicable to only the third pilot group, we expect that the third pilot group may experience more exaggerated effects than either of the other groups.
Our paper closely relates to recent studies analyzing the role of the Tick Size Pilot on trading activity across market fee models. Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong (2017) investigate the recent tick size pilot in relation to market-fee models. However, our paper differs by using a difference-in-difference approach in determining changes in market share following the tick size, providing evidence of increasing order and trading flow to inverted fee models (taker-maker models)
as well as by each exchange -a finding consistent with Lin, Swan, and Mollica (2017). Additionally, while both Lin, Swan and Mollica and Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong examine the role of market quality across maker-taker and taker-maker fee models, our paper focuses on the changes in Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong posit that fast traders benefit by sending orders to inverted fee (taker-maker) models, yet we do not find any evidence that measures of algorithmic trading increase on these fee models following the tick size change despite inverted fee models receiving a higher market share.
Our results show an increase (decrease) in order flow to taker-maker (maker-taker) fee models. Specifically, we find a significant decline (-37%) in order volume for maker-taker fee models following the tick size implementation. Moreover, this finding is not limited to one exchange as all maker-taker exchanges experience a decline in order volume. Further, our results hold across all pilot groups despite the different trading and quoting rules applied to each group. Overall, these findings are consistent with both Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013) and Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2015) that increasing the tick size results in increased trading activity and order flow to taker-maker fee models.
We find some evidence that algorithmic trading declines on maker-taker models in the presence of a larger tick size. We find mixed results regarding the tick size change and the level of algorithmic trading in the pilot firms on taker-maker fee models. While our results do not support recent works of Ye and Yao (2014) and O'Hara, Saar, and Zhong (2015) , who suggest that a tick size increase provides an advantage for faster algorithmic traders, our results align with Weild, Kim, and Newport (2012) and others who suggest that a larger tick size constrains algorithmic activity. 6 Lastly, we find that an increase in the tick size results in a decrease in hidden liquidity. These findings hold
across all pilot groups -although the last pilot group subject to the trade-at prohibition experiences a slightly larger decline. These results confirm the theoretical and empirical research that a tick size increase reduces the risk of informed traders undercutting resting limit orders which increases the incentives to expose orders.
Our results indicate that changing the tick size influences which market fee models, makertaker or taker-maker, obtain market share. This impacts the revenues these fee models collect and can impact how they might alter future fees and rebates. Further, while the aim of the tick size pilot is to help facilitate liquidity in smaller capitalized securities, our finding that the inverted fee models (i.e., taker maker) obtain higher market share may indicate an unintended consequence associated with queue-jumping, which allows traders to effectively jump ahead of other traders. Increases in queue-jumping stand against the design of Reg NMS in reducing the level of "quote-matching"-related strategies. However, we also show that measures of hidden and algorithmic trading decline for the pilot firms following the tick size, suggesting that the tick size may have met some of its proposed goals.
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II. Empirical Predictions
Ye and Yao (2014) posit that taker-maker markets capture a higher market share for more tick constrained securities, which is in line with the reasoning of Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2013) .
Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel suggest that a higher (lower) relative tick size implies a shift to takermaker (maker-taker) models to adjust the optimal tick size. Consistent with this notion, O'Hara, Saar, and Zhong (2015) show that the activity of stocks with a large relative tick size are more fragmented -with considerable trading activity occurring on venues where sub-penny pricing occurs. Such an outcome manifests since the optimal tick size, one that produces the highest trading rate, is now constrained. Consistent with Ye and Yao, we posit that increases in the minimum tick 7 According to seekingalpha.com, one goal is to ascertain whether a wider tick size provides a more robust market for investors; however, one real target of the experiment may be high frequency traders (HFTs).
size incentivizes liquidity providers to use taker-maker inverted fee models to undercut trading prices by paying the venue fee. Therefore, our first empirical prediction is that we expect the overall level of trading activity to increase (decrease) in taker-maker (maker-taker) fee models following an increase in tick size.
Our second empirical prediction builds on our first prediction. We posit that the increase in tick size will increase market share on taker-maker models. To the extent that increases in market share in taker-maker fee models is driven by queue-jumping, then the level of algorithmic trading may be impacted. Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner (2015) posit that the level of algorithmic trading is inversely related with queue-jumping. 8 However, Ye and Yao (2014) suggest that a larger relative tick size reduces the impact of the trader quoting the best prices while allowing the trader with the fastest speed to gain priority. Hence, in a market with a smaller relative tick size, the trader able to quote better prices obtains priority over the trader with faster execution speeds. Ye and Yao further suggest that fast traders benefit when price competition is more constrained in low-priced securities and that time priority takes on a more significant role in determining who provides liquidity. If the tick size is likely to act as a binding constraint in low-priced securities (see Porter and Weaver, 1997) , then an exogenous shock (i.e., increase) in the tick size provides a benefit to fasttraders. Therefore, our second empirical prediction is that we expect the level of algorithmic trading to increase following the tick size increase for the pilot firms in taker-maker fee models.
9
Our second empirical prediction argues that algorithmic trading will increase on taker-maker fee models; however, we are uncertain as to the effect of a tick size increase on algorithmic trading on maker-taker fee models. To the extent that the inverted fee model offers traders a chance to 8 Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner (2015) suggest, however, that HFT trading on dark venues may increase if dark venues become viable substitute trading venues for HFTs in the presence of increased queue-jumping. However, they do not provide a direct test since their measure of HFT is admittedly limited. While not accounting for the role of queue-jumping, Harris (1999) predicts that electronic proprietary traders are likely to be less profitable in a wider ticksize environment, as it becomes costlier to submit and cancel orders. 9 Such a finding would be consistent with Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong (2017) , who argue that high frequency traders benefit from inverted fee models. bypass tick size constraints by paying the venue fee, the level of algorithmic trading on maker-taker models may decline. Further, if queue-jumping activity increases on taker-maker models following the tick size increase, then algorithmic trading could decrease as described by Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner (2015) .
Our third empirical prediction pertains to the role of the tick size and measures of hidden liquidity. Recently, several studies (see Kwan, Masulis, and McInish, 2015; Foley and Putnins, 2016; Comerton-Forde, Malinova, and Park, 2016; and Comerton-Forde, Gregoire, and Zhong, 2017) investigate the role of tick size and trading activity that takes place in dark pools (i.e., off-exchange).
Trading in dark venues allows market participants to bypass the lit market tick constraint and obtain a finer pricing grid.
10 Thus, increases to the tick size raises the incentive for traders to migrate toward dark venues. However, Degryse, Tombeur, and Wuyts (2015) (2015) suggest that increasing the tick size raises the incentive to display liquidity. However, Gozluklu (2016) suggests that the relative tick size has no influence in the decision to use hidden liquidity. In this paper, we posit that the level of hidden liquidity in the market will decline for pilot stocks after the tick size change.
Further, we examine if the level of hidden liquidity changes across taker-maker and makertaker fee models following the tick size increase. Harris (2013) shows that maker-taker pricing is associated with an increase in displayed depth for tick-constrained stocks (i.e., binding) as traders 10 Unlike dark trading venues, hidden orders on lit venues do not provide traders the opportunity to subvert pricing grids. compete to obtain liquidity rebates. If the tick size increase results in an increase in queue-jumping activity on taker-maker fee models -resulting in potential undercutting risk, then hidden liquidity may be impacted. Specifically, if the larger tick size increases undercutting risk of resting limit orders on taker-maker models, then we expect a stronger decline in hidden liquidity on taker-maker fee models. Therefore, our fourth empirical prediction is that we expect the level of hidden liquidity for firms trading in taker-maker (maker-taker) fee models will be more (less) impacted by the tick size increase.
V. Data and Metrics
Our sample stocks are identified by the SEC. According to the proposal provided by FINRA and the exchanges, an operating committee managed the pilot security grouping process. 11 To be eligible, an exchange-listed stock must have an average daily trading volume of no greater than one million shares, a volume-weighted price of at least $2.00 each day, and a market capitalization not exceeding $3 billion. Eligible stocks are assigned to one of three designated pilot groups or a control group based on a stratified random sampling process. This sampling procedure consists of categorizing pilot securities based on volume-weighted average price, market capitalization on the final day of the measurement period, and trading volume based on the consolidated average daily volume during the period. Pilot securities are randomly assigned from each stratified category into one of the three pilot groups based on the proportion of pilot securities comprised of that category.
Thus, each category is represented in the three pilot groups. Each pilot group contains 400 eligible pilot securities. The remaining eligible securities (approximately 1,400) not positioned in one of the three pilot groups are considered part of the control group. We use data from the SEC's Market Information Data Analytics System (MIDAS) for information on trading activity. The database includes information on order cancellations, trades, hidden trades, order volume, and odd-lots by each listed exchange. 12 We also use measures provided by the MIDAS database to construct proxies for algorithmic trading, hidden liquidity, and market
activity. An advantage of using the MIDAS data set is that it allows for an in-depth look at order flow and trading activity by stock and across fee models.
In addition to the MIDAS database, we also obtain data from both CRSP and TAQ for control measures related to market capitalization, price, volume, turnover, and bid-ask spreads. We must merge data on ticker symbol when using MIDAS. Our initial sample contains a total of 2,282 firms, with 1,141 pilot and control firms. After matching data between the MIDAS, CRSP, and TAQ databases, our final sample count of pilot and control firms 976, and 974, respectively. 13 In Table 1 , we provide summary statistics for both the pilot and control firms, calculated using CRSP data in the six weeks preceding the beginning of the pilot program. Overall, the measures indicate that the average trading price, share turnover, daily range, market capitalization, and trading volume are similar across both pilot and control firms.
We use a 60-day event window period, covering 30 trading days before and after the implementation dates for the selected securities. Since this approach focuses on trading days, the event window covers roughly two months before and after the tick size implementation. The 12 One limitation of using MIDAS is that we cannot distinguish between various types of hidden liquidity such as fully hidden, "iceberg" or "reserve" orders. 13 Our sample contains 87% of all pilot and control firms in the SEC's Tick Size Program. We focus on the market activity of maker-taker and taker-maker fee models following the implementation of the Tick Size Pilot Program. There are currently three exchanges that report to MIDAS which offer the inverted (i.e., taker-maker) fee model: BATS-Y, BOSTON, and EDGE-A.
We include all three exchanges in our study; hence, we include all taker-maker trading activity. Most U.S. stock exchanges operate under the maker-taker fee model. However, the trading activity associated with several exchanges in the MIDAS data is low. 14 Hence, we limit the maker-taker portion of our sample to the five exchanges with the most activity in our pilot firms: ARCA, BATS-Z, EDGE-X, NASDAQ, and NYSE.
We use MIDAS data to construct four proxies of algorithmic trading, including Odd-to- Menkveld (2011), who posit that the increased existence of algorithmic activity is associated with periods of more frequent order submissions without subsequent trading due to high cancellation.
This measure is also the inverse of the order-to-trade ratio used by Ye and Yao (2014) and Friederich and Payne (2015) in capturing algorithmic trading. The expected relation between Trade-14 AMEX, CHX NSX, and PHLX are included in the MIDAS data. However, these fee models report little data for the sample firms, which limits our ability to draw inferences. For example, we document that these exchanges combined account for only 1.7% and 5.2% of the trades and trade volume in our 60-day sample period. We believe that the results presented in this paper are unlikely to be influenced by the omission of these exchanges. 
VI. Empirical Results
We present both our univariate and multivariate analysis of the relation between tick size change and changes in the levels of trading activity, hidden liquidity, and algorithmic trading across the two fee models, maker-taker and taker-maker. Table 2 provides the aggregate breakdown of order and trade volumes for the pilot securities, partitioned by exchange and fee model, both before and after the tick size change. Panel A reports both order and trade volumes for each exchange 15 However, we suggest that this measure be interpreted with caution. The trade-to-order ratio might reflect the probability of execution. For taker-maker models, the increased market share following a tick size increase could reflect a large increase in marketable orders, mechanically affecting the trade-to-order ratio. We would like to thank the referee for pointing this out. BOSTON, another taker-maker exchange, increases from 3% in the pre-period to 11% in the postperiod, representing a nearly 400% increase, and EDGE-A goes from 3% to 5%. The results in Panels C and D show that two of the three taker-maker fee models also experience notable increases in trade volume following the tick size change. Specifically, BATS-Y and BOSTON go from 7% and 5% of overall market share of trading volume in the pre-tick size change period to 16% and 12% in the post-tick size change period, respectively. EDGE-A volume stays level at 4%. Overall, our initial analysis supports our first empirical prediction that the tick size change affects trading and order flow on inverted fee models. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r R e v i e w O n l y 15 Panel C). Following the tick size change, the aggregate order volume on taker-maker fee models account for 28% of total order volume, representing a percentage increase of 233%. Similarly, levels of aggregate trade volume increase for taker-maker fee models following the tick size change, going from 17% in the pre-period to 31% in the post-period, representing an 82% increase. Table 3 provides additional measures of market activity for both pilot and control firms. In addition to trade and order volume measures shown in Table 2 , Table 3 lists odd-lot volume, number of trades, cancellations, and hidden orders for pilot and control firms across both exchange fee models, that is, for maker-taker and taker-maker models. In Panel A of Table 3 , we find that the order volume does not decrease for the control firms as it does for the pilot firms in the maker-taker fee models. Likewise, the trade volume increases by 28.8% for the control firms, whereas the pilot firms experience no significant change. Panel A of Table 3 also shows significant decreases in oddlot volume, cancellations, and hidden trades in pilot firms. Conversely, these measures significantly increase for control firms, except for the cancellation measure, where there is no significant change. Table 3 , Panel B provides differences in pilot and control firms on taker-maker exchanges.
Unlike the differences between pilot and control firms provided in Panel A, Panel B shows that both the pilot and control firms experience similar directional shifts following the tick size change but vary by the scale of the shift. For example, while trade and odd lot volume increase for control firms, the increase is less than one-third of the magnitude experienced by the pilot firms. Finally, one similarity in Panels A and B is that hidden trades decline for pilot firms under both maker-taker and taker-maker fee models. Panel C reports the differences between the pilot and control firms across both maker-taker and taker-maker fee models. We find that order, trade, and odd-lot volume decrease (increase) for pilot firms on maker-taker (taker-maker) fee models following the tick size increase. Overall, the initial univariate analysis supports our predictions that increases in the tick size result in an increase in trading activity to taker-maker fee models with a simultaneous decline in hidden liquidity.
To further demonstrate the change in trade and order volume across both fee models following the tick size change, we create market share measures that capture levels of taker-maker trades and orders relative to consolidated trade amount (taker-maker + maker-taker), respectively for each stock, calculated daily. This measure is equally-weighted across the trading days before and after the tick size change. Figure 3 shows the time series of taker-maker market share for both order and trade volume for both pilot and control firms, providing additional evidence as to the growth of taker-maker volume after the tick size change.
In Table 4 , we provide a look at levels of algorithmic activity for pilot and control firms for both exchange fee models following the tick size change. Panels A and B in Buti, Consonni, Rindi, Wen, and Werner (2015) . Our results from a difference-indifference analysis, provided in Panel C, confirm that the level algorithmic trading declines considerably for the pilot stocks in the maker-taker models relative to the taker-maker models. Table 5 provides univariate results that relate to our prediction that measures of hidden liquidity decline after the tick size increase. The measures used to capture hidden liquidity include Hidden-to-Trade and Hidden-to-Order. These measures capture the relative use of hidden trades and orders per firm. While the raw measure, Hidden Volume, decreases considerably for stocks in the maker-taker fee models, the relative measures control for the decline in order volume experienced by the exchange. Therefore, the relative measures better capture levels of hidden liquidity in the market. Panel A in Table 5 shows that measures of hidden liquidity decline for the pilot firms in the maker-taker fee models following the tick size change. Both Hidden-to-Order and Hidden-to-Trade decline 24.9% and 26.2%, respectively for the pilot firms following the tick size change, while there is no significant change for control firms. Panels A and B in Table 5 show our initial results support our last two predictions in that both fee models experience a decline in hidden liquidity with a larger decline for the firms trading in the taker-maker fee model. Interestingly, the measures of Hidden-toTrade and Hidden-to-Order for pilot firms in the taker-maker fee models in the post-period are less than half the levels of the pre-period. Panel C of Table 5 reports our results from the difference-indifference analysis. Our findings in Panel C of Table 5 show that pilot firms experience a decline in hidden liquidity relative to control firms across both fee models after the tick size change.
Additionally, we show that the declines in both Hidden-to-Trade and Hidden-to-Order are larger for pilot firms in taker-maker fee models, relative to maker-taker fee models. Overall, the evidence supports our predictions that increases to the tick size reduce the level of hidden liquidity, with a larger impact on the taker-maker fee models.
While our univariate analysis provides initial support that increasing the tick size results in increases in trading activity on taker-maker fee models and reduces hidden liquidity, we now focus on a multivariate setting to control for other explanatory effects. We employ multiple regressions controlling for other characteristics that might influence the levels of trading activity such as volatility, firm size, and share price. In our multivariate analysis, we employ fixed-effect OLS regressions to test the levels of algorithmic trading and hidden liquidity for both pilot and control firms across the two fee models, before and after the tick size change.
We use equation (1) to estimate the impact of the tick size change on algorithmic trading, ‫ܶܣ‬ ,௧ , and provide the first set of regressions used in the analysis. ‫ܶܣ‬ ,௧ refers to the level of algorithmic trading, measured by one of the proxies described earlier. ‫ݐݏܲ‬ ,௧ is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the observation is after the tick size change, zero otherwise. ‫ݐ݈݅ܲ‬ ,௧ is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is a pilot firm, zero otherwise. The interaction term ‫ݐݏܲ‬ * ‫ݐ݈݅ܲ‬ ,௧ captures the difference-in-difference between the pilot and control firms across the pre-and-post event windows. The remaining variables include controls for the bid-ask spread, daily turnover, firm size, price, and daily volatility. Full variable definitions are provided in Appendix C.
Date fixed-effects are included in the model. Likewise, standard errors are clustered at the firm and date level.
We expect algorithmic trading will increase on taker-maker fee models. Hence, we expect the coefficient for our interaction term, Post * Pilot, will be positive for both Odd-to-Volume and Cancel-to- Table 6 provide little support for our prediction. We find that both Trade Size and Odd-to-Volume decline in the post-period for our takermaker models, consistent with lower algorithmic trading. We document no change in the Trade-toOrder ratio. In fact, we find that the Cancel-to-Trade ratio increases for the pilot firms in the postperiod. In sum, these results provide mixed evidence as to a change in algorithmic trading for pilot firms on taker-maker fee models following the tick size change. With regards to maker-taker fee models, we find that all four measures of algorithmic trading change in the direction consistent with a reduction in algorithmic trading. In testing our third and fourth predictions, we augment equation (1) by replacing the dependent variable with measures of hidden liquidity, Hidden-to-Trade and Hidden-to-Order. Consistent with the previous set of regressions, we include date fixed-effects in the model with standard errors clustered at the firm and date level. The coefficient, ߚ ଷ , captures the difference-in-difference. The estimates we present in Table 7 indicate that both maker-taker and taker-maker fee models, pilot firms in the post-period experience a significant decline in hidden liquidity. Notably, the coefficient size estimates differ substantially. For example, coefficients for the interaction term, Post * Pilot, are -0.059 and -0.061 for the maker-taker fee models. For the taker-maker fee models, the interaction term, Post * Pilot, is -0.194 and -0.204. We employ a Z-test to confirm that the estimates for the coefficients are different across fee models. The results from the Z-test confirm that the estimates are significantly different, supporting our fourth empirical prediction that takermaker fee models experience a stronger decline in hidden liquidity. 16 These findings are consistent with the univariate tests in which we find support for both predictions 3 and 4, mainly that hidden liquidity levels decreases across all fee models with a larger effect for pilot firms trading on takermaker fee models. Figure 5 show the overall level of hidden liquidity between the pilot and control firms across all fee models. Panels C and D in Figure 5 display the decline in hidden liquidity among the pilot firms in the maker-taker and taker-maker fee models. These visuals provide more insight into the impact of the tick size change on hidden liquidity. Table 8 provides regression estimates for the pilot and control firms from the first pilot group. Consistent with the findings in Table 5 , we find that pilot firms trading in the maker-taker fee models experience a significant decline in measures of algorithmic trading. Likewise, we find mixed results for the pilot firms trading in the taker-maker fee models. For instance, the measures of 16 Our findings from a triple-difference tests confirm our findings from the Z-test, indicating that the decline in hidden liquidity for the pilot firms is larger on the taker-maker fee models relative to the maker-taker fee models. The results from the triple-difference tests are available upon request. Table 8 suggest that the quoting and trading increments applied to the first set of pilot firms do not alter our overall findings.
VII. Robustness
In Table 9 and Table 10 , we provide the regressions estimates for the second and third pilot group related to changes in algorithmic trading following the tick size increase. Similar to our previous findings, we find that the measures of algorithmic trading decline significantly following the tick size change for the pilot securities trading in maker-taker models. The results for the pilot firms trading in the taker-maker fee models offer conflicting results as to the change in algorithmic trading. Overall, our results are consistent with a suggestion that the maker-taker fee models experience a considerable decrease in measures of algorithmic trading.
Finally, Table 11 shows estimates from equation (2) applied to the three pilot groups. Our analysis is consistent with the notion that the tick size increase reduces the level of hidden liquidity, with the greatest impact on the taker-maker fee models. Consistent with the "trade-at prohibition" associated with the third pilot group, we find that the decline in hidden liquidity is most severe for both the pilot and controls firms associated with the third pilot group. Nevertheless, our results hold for both the first two pilot groups, indicating that the main results are not driven by the third pilot group. Our analysis suggests that if one of the goals of the tick size program is to reduce the presence of non-displayed orders, the program has achieved some initial success.
VIII. Conclusion
U.S. stock markets have gravitated toward rebate-and-fee based models. Since its introduction, the maker-taker fee model has evolved as the fee model employed by most of the major U.S. stock markets. This fee model has come under considerable criticism by policymaker and Despite these concerns, minimal empirical evidence exists as to how the maker-taker fee model and the inverted version, the taker-maker fee model, are affected by changes in the minimum price increment (i.e., tick size). We contribute to the literature by examining the effects of the SEC's Tick
Size Pilot on trading activity across both maker-taker and taker-maker fee models. Further, we use the Tick Size Pilot to examine how measures of algorithmic and hidden trading adjust to changes in the tick size.
Our findings are likely to be useful to regulators and policymakers in finding the "optimal"
tick size for stimulating market activity. First, this study reports that taker-maker fee models are likely to serve traders inclined to bypass queues associated with tick size constraints. Second, measures of algorithmic trading appear to decline following the tick size increase for the pilot firms.
Third, hidden liquidity levels are lower for the pilot firms following the tick size change. More generally, our findings suggest that changes to the pricing grid (i.e., tick size) influence where trading activity migrates (i.e., fee models) and how subsets (i.e., hidden, algorithmic) of trading activity are affected.
17 See Angel, Harris, and Spatt (2011, 2015) for discussion on the harmful effects of maker-taker fee models on market quality. 18 https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-urged-to-launch-pilot-program-for-curbing-maker-taker-fee-plans-1468015388 Page 25 of 43
The Financial Review   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r R e v i e w O n l y 26 ***, ** report significance at 0.01, and 0.05, respectively. Table 2 Trading statistics by exchange and fee model 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 O n l y 27 Table 3 Trading activity by fee model Table 3 provides univariate results for the measures of trading activity for both the pilot and control firms across both market fee models, maker-taker (MT) and takermaker (TM). The pre-and post-period captures the 30 days before and after the implementation of the SEC's Tick Size Pilot Program. The measures listed below are obtained from the SEC's MIDAS database. Appendix C provides full definitions. Standard t-tests are used to calculate the differences between pre-and post-periods. 8.87*** 7.85*** 7.32*** 6.73*** 2.67*** 5.10*** 5.62*** ***, ** report significance at 0.01, and 0.05, respectively.
Panel A. MT -Maker Taker
Page 27 of 43 The Financial Review   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 O n l y 28 Table 4 Algorithmic trading by exchange fee model 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 O n l y 29 Table 5 Hidden trading by fee model O n l y 30 Table 6 Algorithmic trading and fee models Table 6 reports the regression results using equation (1) O n l y 31 Table 7 Hidden trading and fee models Table 7 reports the regression results from equation (2) applied to all pilot group securities and controls by fee model (i.e., maker-taker and taker-maker models). The dependent variable represents a measure of hidden liquidity. Full definitions are provided in both Appendix B and C. Measures for both the dependent and independent variables are taken from the SEC's MIDAS database, CRSP, and TAQ. T-stats are reported in parentheses. Date fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and date level. Results are provided from a Z-test in comparing the coefficients from separate regressions.
Maker-Taker
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The Financial Review   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 O n l y 32 Table 8 Algorithmic trading and fee models for first pilot O n l y 33 Table 9 Algorithmic trading and fee models for second pilot Table 9 reports the regression results using equation (1) applied only to the second pilot group securities by fee model (i.e., maker-taker and taker-maker models). The dependent variable represents a measure of algorithmic trading. Full definitions are provided in both Appendix A and C. Measures for both the dependent and independent variables are taken from the SEC's MIDAS database, CRSP, and TAQ. T-stats are reported in parentheses. Date fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and date level.
Maker-Taker
Taker-Maker O n l y 34   Table 10 Algorithmic trading and fee models for third pilot Table 10 reports the regression results using equation (1) applied only to the third pilot group securities by fee model (i.e., maker-taker and taker-maker models). The dependent variable represents a measure of algorithmic trading. Full definitions are provided in both Appendix A and C. Measures for both the dependent and independent variables are taken from the SEC's MIDAS database, CRSP, and TAQ. T-stats are reported in parentheses. Date fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and date level.
Taker-Maker Odd-toVolume 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 O n l y 35   Table 11 Hidden trading and fee models for each pilot Table 11 reports the regression results from equation (2) applied to the three pilot groups by fee model (i.e., maker-taker and taker-maker models), separately. The dependent variable represents a measure of hidden liquidity. Full definitions are provided in both Appendix B and C. Measures for both the dependent and independent variables are taken from the SEC's MIDAS database, CRSP, and TAQ. T-stats are reported in parentheses. Date-fixed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and date level. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 O n l y Page 37 of 43
The Financial Review   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 O n l y 38 Figure 3 Taker-maker market share ratios Figure 3 shows the level of taker-maker order and trade volume relative to total order and trade volume between the pilot and controls firms in the sample. Full definitions are provided in Appendix C. Panel A shows the change in the taker-maker market share by order volume over the event window period. Panel B shows the change in the taker-maker market share by trade volume over the event window period. The graph covers the entire event window 30 days before and after the tick size change.
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Page 39 of 43
The Financial Review   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47 O n l y 40 Figure 5 Hidden trading ratios Figure 5 shows the level hidden liquidity in the maker-taker (MT) and taker-maker (TM) fee models. Full definitions are provided in Appendix B. Panel A shows the level hidden liquidity as measured by Hidden-to-Trade between the pilot and control firms over the event window. Panel B shows the level of hidden liquidity as measured by Hidden-to-Volume over the event window between the pilot and control firms over the event window. Panel C shows the level hidden liquidity as measured by Hidden-to-Trade for the pilot firms between the two exchanges models over the event window. Panel D shows the level of hidden liquidity as measured by Hidden-to-Volume for the pilot firms between the two exchanges models over the event window.
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